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1 Introduction
The theory of general equilibrium with imperfectly competitive markets is still in infancy. In his
survey of the various attempts made in the 1970s and 1980s to integrate oligopolistic competition
within the general equilibrium framework, Hart (1985) has convincingly argued that these contri-
butions have failed to produce a consistent and workable model. Unintentionally, the absence of a
general equilibrium model of oligopolistic competition has paved the way to the success of the CES
model of monopolistic competition developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). And indeed, the CES
model has been used in so many economic fields that a large number of scholars believe that this
is the model of monopolistic competition. For example, Head and Mayer (2014) observe that this
model is “nearly ubiquitous” in the trade literature. However, owing to its extreme simplicity, the
CES model dismisses several important eﬀects that contradict basic findings in economic theory,
as well as empirical evidence. To mention a few, unlike what the CES predicts, prices and firm
sizes are aﬀected by entry, market size and consumer income, while markups vary with costs.
In addition, tweaking the CES or using other specific models in the hope of obviating these dif-
ficulties does not permit to check the robustness of the results. For example, quadratic preferences
are consistent with lower prices and higher average productivity in larger markets. By contrast,
quadratic preferences imply that prices are independent of income, the reason being that they are
nested in a quasi-linear utility. The eﬀect of GDP per capita can be restored if preferences are
indirectly additive, but then prices no longer depend on the number of competitors. If preferences
are CES and the market structure is oligopolistic, markups depend again on the number of firms,
but no longer on the GDP per capita. In sum, it seems fair to say that the state of the art looks like
a scattered field of incomplete and insuﬃciently related contributions in search of a more general
approach.
Our purpose is to build a general model of monopolistic competition that has the following two
features. First, it encompasses all existing models of monopolistic competition, including the CES.
Second, it displays enough flexibility to take into account demand and competition attributes in a
way that will allow us to determine under which conditions many findings are valid. In this respect,
we concur with Mrázová and Neary (2013) that “assumptions about the structure of preferences
and demand matter enormously for comparative statics.” This is why we consider a setting in
which preferences are unspecified and characterize preferences through necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for each comparative static eﬀect to hold. This allows us to identify which findings hold
true against alternative preference specifications, and those which depend on particular classes
of preferences. This should be useful to the applied economists in discriminating between the
diﬀerent specifications used in their settings. The flip side of the coin is the need to reduce the
complexity of the problem. This is why, in the baseline model, we focus on competition among
symmetric firms. We see this as a necessary step toward the development and analysis of a fully
general theory of monopolistic competition.
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By modeling monopolistic competition as a noncooperative game with a continuum of players,
we are able to obviate at least two major problems.1 First, we capture Chamberlin’s central idea
according to which the cross elasticities of demands are equal to zero, the reason being that each
firm is negligible to the market. Second, whereas the redistribution of firms’ profits is at the root
of the non-existence of an equilibrium in general equilibrium with oligopolistic competition, we get
rid of this feedback eﬀect because individual firms are unable to manipulate profits. Thus, firms
do not have to make full general equilibrium calculations before choosing their profit-maximizing
strategy. Admittedly, the continuum assumption may be viewed as a deus ex machina. But we end
up with a consistent and analytically tractable model in which firms are bound together through
variables that give rise to income and substitution eﬀects in consumers’ demand. This has a far-
fetched implication: even though firms do not compete strategically, our model is able to mimic
oligopolistic markets and to generate within a general equilibrium framework findings akin to those
obtained in partial equilibrium settings. As will be shown, the CES is the only case in which all
eﬀects vanish.
Our main findings may be summarized as follows. First, using an extension of the concept of
diﬀerentiability to the case where the unknowns are functions rather than vectors, we determine a
general demand system, which includes a wide range of special cases such as the CES, quadratic,
CARA, additive, indirectly additive, and homothetic preferences. At any symmetric market out-
come, the individual demand for a variety depends only upon its consumption when preferences are
additive. By contrast, when preferences are homothetic, the demand for a variety depends upon
its relative consumption level and the mass of available varieties. Therefore, when preferences are
neither additive nor homothetic, the demand for a variety must depend on its consumption level
and the total mass of available varieties.
Second, to prove the existence and uniqueness of a free-entry equilibrium and to study its
properties, we need to impose some restrictions on the demand side of our model. Rather than
making new assumptions on preferences and demands, we tackle the problem from the viewpoint
of the theory of product diﬀerentiation. To be precise, the key concept of our model is the elasticity
of substitution across varieties. We then exploit the symmetry of preferences over a continuum of
goods to show that, under the most general specification of preferences, at any symmetric outcome
the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is a function of two variables only: the per
variety consumption and the total mass of firms. Combining this with the absence of the business-
stealing eﬀect of oligopoly theory reveals that, at the market equilibrium, firms’ markup is equal
to the inverse of the equilibrium value of the elasticity of substitution. This result agrees with one
of the main messages of industrial organization: the higher is the elasticity of substitution, the less
diﬀerentiated are varieties, and thus the lower are firms’ markup.
Therefore, it should be clear that the properties of the symmetric free-entry equilibrium depends
1The idea of using a continuum of firms was proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz in their 1974 working paper, which
has been published in Brakman and Heijdra (2004)
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on how the elasticity of substitution function behaves when the per variety consumption and the
mass of firms vary with the main parameters of the economy. This allows us to study the market
outcome by means of simple analytical arguments. To be precise, by imposing plausible conditions
to the elasticity of substitution function, we are able to disentangle the various determinants of
firms’ strategies. We will determine our preferred set of assumptions by building on what the
theory of product diﬀerentiation tells us, as well as on empirical evidence.
Third, to insulate the impact of various types of preferences on the market outcome, we focus
on symmetric firms and, therefore, on symmetric free-entry equilibria. We provide necessary and
suﬃcient conditions on the elasticity of substitution for the existence and uniqueness of a free-entry
equilibrium. Our setting is especially well suited to conduct detailed comparative static analyses
in that we can determine the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for all the thought experiments
undertaken in the literature. The most typical experiment is to study the impact of market size.
What market size signifies is not always clear because it compounds two variables, i.e., the number
of consumers and their willingness-to-pay for the product under consideration. The impact of
population size and income level on prices, output and the number of firms need not be the same
because these two parameters aﬀect firms’ demand in diﬀerent ways. An increase in population
or in income raises demand, thereby fostering entry and lower prices. But an income hike also
raises consumers’ willingness-to-pay, which tends to push prices upward. The final impact is thus
a priori ambiguous.
We show that a larger market results in a lower market price and bigger firms if and only if
the elasticity of substitution responds more to a change in the mass of varieties than to a change
in the per variety consumption. This is so in the likely case where the entry of new firms does
not render varieties much more diﬀerentiated. Regarding the mass of varieties, it increases with
the number of consumers if varieties do not become too similar when their number rises. Thus,
like most oligopoly models, monopolistic competition exhibits the standard pro-competitive eﬀects
associated with market size and entry. However, anti-competitive eﬀects cannot be ruled out a
priori. Furthermore, an increase in individual income generates similar, but not identical, eﬀects
if and only if varieties become closer substitutes when their range widens. The CES is the only
utility for which price and output are independent of both income and market size.
Our setting also allows us to study the impact of a cost change on markups. When all firms face
the same productivity hike, we show that the nature of preferences determines the extent of the
pass-through. Specifically, a decrease in marginal cost leads to a lower market price, but a higher
markup, if and only if the elasticity of substitution decreases with the per capita consumption. In
this event, there is incomplete pass-through. However, the pass-through rate need not be smaller
than one.
Last, we discuss three major extensions of our baseline model. In the first one, we focus
on Melitz-like heterogeneous firms. In this case, when preferences are non-additive, the profit-
maximizing strategy of a firm depends directly on the strategies chosen by all the other types’ firms,
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which vastly increases the complexity of the problem. Despite of this, we show that, regardless of
the distribution of marginal costs, firms are sorted out by decreasing productivity order, while a
bigger market sustains a larger number of active firms. We highlight the role of the elasticity of
substitution by showing that it now depends on the number entrants and the cutoﬀ costs for each
type of firm. In the second, we consider a multisector economy. The main additional diﬃculty stems
from the fact that the sector-specific expenditures depend on the upper-tier utility. Under a fairly
mild assumption on the marginal utility, we prove the existence of an equilibrium and show that
many of our results hold true for the monopolistically competitive sector. This highlights the idea
that our model can be used as a building block to embed monopolistic competition in full-fledged
general equilibrium models coping with various economic issues. Our last extension addresses
the almost untouched issue of consumer heterogeneity in love-for-variety models of monopolistic
competition. Consumers may be heterogeneous because of taste and/or income diﬀerences. Here,
we will restrict ourselves to special, but meaningful, cases.
Related literature. Diﬀerent alternatives have been proposed to avoid the main pitfalls of the
CES model. Behrens and Murata (2007) propose the CARA utility that captures both price and
size eﬀects, while Zhelobodko et al. (2012) use general additive preferences to work with a variable
elasticity of substitution, and thus variable markups. Bertoletti and Etro (2014) consider an
additive indirect utility function to study the impact of per capita income on the market outcome,
but price and firm size are independent of population size. Vives (1999) and Ottaviano et al.
(2002) show how the quadratic utility model obviates some of the diﬃculties associated with the
CES model, while delivering a full analytical solution. Bilbiie et al. (2012) use general symmetric
homothetic preferences in a real business cycle model. Last, pursuing a diﬀerent objective, Mrázová
and Neary (2013) study a specific class of demand functions, that is, those which leaves the
relationships between the elasticity and convexity of demands unchanged, and aim to predict the
welfare eﬀects of a wide range of shocks.
In the next section, we describe the demand and supply sides of our setting. The primitive of
the model being the elasticity of substitution function, we discuss in Section 3 how this function
may vary with the per variety consumption and the mass of varieties. In Section 4, we prove the
existence and uniqueness of a free-entry equilibrium and characterize its various properties. The
three extensions are discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes.
2 The model and preliminary results
Consider an economy with a mass L of identical consumers, one sector and one production factor
– labor, which is used as the numéraire. Each consumer is endowed with y eﬃciency units of labor,
so that per capita labor income y is given and the same across consumers because the unit wage is
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1.2 On the supply side, there is a continuum of firms producing each a horizontally diﬀerentiated
good under increasing returns. Each firm supplies a single variety and each variety is supplied by
a single firm.
2.1 Consumers
Let N , an arbitrarily large number, be the mass of “potential” varieties, e.g., the varieties for which
a patent exists. Very much like in the Arrow-Debreu model where all commodities need not be
produced and consumed, all potential varieties are not necessarily made available to consumers.
We denote by N ≤ N the endogenous mass of available varieties.
Since we work with a continuum of varieties, we cannot use the standard tools of calculus
anymore. Rather, we must work in a functional space whose elements are functions, and not
vectors. A potential consumption profile x ≥ 0 is a (Lebesgue-measurable) mapping from the
space of potential varieties [0,N ] to R+. Since a market price profile p ≥ 0 must belong to the
dual of the space of consumption profiles (Bewley, 1972), we assume that both x and p belong to
L2([0,N ]). This implies that both x and p have a finite mean and variance. The space L2 may be
viewed as the most natural infinite-dimensional extension of Rn.
Individual preferences are described by a utility functional U(x) defined over L2([0,N ]). In
what follows, we make two assumptions about U , which seem close to the “minimal” set of require-
ments for our model to be nonspecific while displaying the desirable features of existing models
of monopolistic competition. First, for any N , the functional U is symmetric in the sense that
any Lebesgue measure-preserving mapping from [0, N ] into itself does not change the value of U .
Intuitively, this means that renumbering varieties has no impact on the utility level.
Second, the utility function exhibits love for variety if, for any N ≤ N , a consumer strictly
prefers to consume the whole range of varieties [0, N ] than any subinterval [0, k] of [0, N ], that is,
U
￿
X
k
I[0,k]
￿
< U
￿
X
N
I[0,N ]
￿
, (1)
where X > 0 is the consumer’s total consumption of the diﬀerentiated good and IA is the indicator
of A ￿ [0, N ].
Proposition 1. If U(x) is continuous and strictly quasi-concave, then consumers exhibit love
for variety.
The proof is given in Appendix 1. The convexity of preferences is often interpreted as a “taste
for diversification” (Mas-Collel et al., 1995, p.44). Our definition of “love for variety” is weaker than
that of convex preferences because the former, unlike the latter, involves symmetric consumption
only. This explains why the reverse of Proposition 1 does not hold. Since (1) holds under any
2At a free-entry equilibrium, a consumer’s income is equal to y because profits are zero. Distinguishing between
y and L allows us to discriminate between the eﬀects generated by a change in the per capita income and the
number of consumers.
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monotone transformation of U , our definition of love for variety is ordinal in nature. In particular,
our definition does not appeal to any parametric measure such as the elasticity of substitution in
CES-based models.
To determine the inverse demand for a variety, we assume that the utility functional U is
diﬀerentiable in x in the following sense: there exists a unique function D(xi,x) from R+ × L2 to
R such that, for any given N and for all h ∈ L2, the equality
U(x+ h) = U(x) +
ˆ N
0
D(xi,x)hi di+ ◦ (||h||2) (2)
holds, ||·||2 being the L2-norm.3 The function D(xi,x) is the marginal utility of variety i. In what
follows, we focus on utility functionals that satisfy (2) for all x ≥ 0 and such that the marginal
utility D(xi,x) is decreasing and diﬀerentiable with respect to the consumption xi of variety i.
That D(xi,x) does not depend directly on i ∈ [0, N ] follows from the symmetry of preferences.
Evidently, D(xi,x) strictly decreases with xi if U is strictly concave.
The reason for restricting ourselves to decreasing marginal utilities is that this property allows
us to work with well-behaved demand functions. Indeed, maximizing the functional U(x) subject
to (i) the budget constraint ˆ N
0
pixidi = Y (3)
where Y ≥ y is the consumer’s income and (ii) the availability constraint
xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [0, N ] and xi = 0 for all i ∈]N,N ]
yields the following inverse demand function for variety i:
pi =
D(xi, x)
λ
for all i ∈ [0, N ], (4)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the consumer’s optimization problem. Expressing λ as a
function of Y and x, we obtain
λ(Y,x) =
´ N
0 xiD(xi,x) di
Y
, (5)
which is the marginal utility of income at the consumption profile x under income Y .
The marginal utility function D(xi, x) also allows determining the Marshallian demand. In-
deed, because the consumer’s budget set is convex and weakly compact in L2([0,N ]), while U
is diﬀerentiable (which means that (2) holds) and strictly quasi-concave, there exists a unique
3For symmetric utility functionals, (2) is equivalent to assuming that U is Frechet-diﬀerentiable in L2 (Dunford
and Schwartz, 1988). The concept of Frechet-diﬀerentiability extends the standard concept of diﬀerentiability in a
fairly natural way.
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utility-maximizing consumption profile x∗(p, Y ) (see Appendix 1). Plugging x∗(p, Y ) into (4) –
(5) and solving (4) for xi, we obtain the Marshallian demand for variety i:
xi = D(pi,p, Y ), (6)
which is weakly decreasing in its own price.4 In other words, when there is a continuum of varieties,
decreasing marginal utilities are a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the Law of demand to hold.
To illustrate, consider the following examples used in the literature.
1. Additive preferences.5 (i) Assume that preferences are additive over the set of available
varieties (Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977):
U(x) ≡
ˆ N
0
u(xi)di, (7)
where u is diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and such that u(0) = 0. The CES and
the CARA (Bertoletti, 2006; Behrens and Murata, 2007) are special cases of (7). The marginal
utility of variety i depends only upon its own consumption:
D(xi,x) = u
￿(xi).
Bertoletti and Etro (2014) have recently proposed a new approach to modeling monopolistic
competition, in which preferences are expressed through the following indirect utility function:
V(p, Y ) ≡
ˆ N
0
v(pi/Y )di,
where v is diﬀerentiable, strictly decreasing and strictly convex. It is readily verified that the
marginal utility of variety i is now given by
D(xi,x) = Λ(x)(v
￿)−1(−Λ(x)xi)
where Λ(x) ≡ Y λ(x, Y ).
2. Homothetic preferences. A tractable example of non-CES homothetic preferences is
the translog proposed by Feenstra (2003). By appealing to the duality principle in consumption
theory, these preferences are described by the following expenditure function:
lnE(p) = lnU0 + 1N
ˆ N
0
ln pidi− β
2N
￿ˆ N
0
(ln pi)
2di− 1N
￿ˆ N
0
ln pidi
￿2￿
.
4Since D is continuously decreasing in xi, there exists at most one solution of (4) with respect to xi. If there is
a finite choke price (D(0,x∗)/λ <∞), there may be no solution. To encompass this case, the Marshallian demand
should be formally defined by D(pi,p, y) ≡ inf{xi ≥ 0 | D(xi,x∗)/λ(y,x∗) ≤ pi}.
5The idea of additive utilities and additive indirect utilities goes back at least to Houthakker (1960).
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In this case, there is no closed-form expression for the marginal utility D(xi,x). Nevertheless,
it can be shown that D(xi,x) may be written as follows:
D(xi,x) = ϕ(xi, A(x)),
where ϕ(x,A) is implicitly defined by
ϕx+ β lnϕ =
1 + βA
N ,
while A(x) is a scalar aggregate determined by
A =
ˆ N
0
lnϕ(xi, A)di.
The aggregate A(x) thus plays a role similar to that of λ (respectively, Λ) under additive
(respectively, indirectly additive) preferences.
3. Non-additive preferences. Consider the quadratic utility:
U(x) ≡ α
ˆ N
0
xidi− β
2
ˆ N
0
x2i di−
γ
2
ˆ N
0
￿ˆ N
0
xi di
￿
xjdj, (8)
where α, β,and γ are positive constants. The marginal utility of variety i is given by
D(xi, x) = α− β xi − γ
ˆ N
0
xjdj,
which is linear decreasing in xi. Note that D decreases with the aggregate consumption across
varieties:
X ≡
ˆ N
0
xjdj,
which captures the idea that the marginal utility of a variety decreases with the total consumption.
Another example of non-additive preferences, which also captures the idea of love for variety is
given by the entropy-like utility:
U(x) ≡ U (X) +X lnX −
ˆ N
0
xi ln xidi,
where U is increasing and strictly concave. The marginal utility of variety i is
D(xi, x) = U
￿(X)− ln
￿xi
X
￿
,
which decreases with xi.
Since the bulk of the applied literature focuses on additive or homothetic preferences, we find
it important to provide a full characterization of the corresponding demands (the proof is given in
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Appendix 3).
Proposition 2. The marginal utility D(xi,x) of variety i depends only upon (i) the consump-
tion xi if and only if preferences are additive and (ii) the consumption ratio x/xi if and only if
preferences are homothetic.
Proposition 2 can be illustrated by using the CES:
U(x) ≡
￿ˆ N
0
x
σ−1
σ
i di
￿ σ
σ−1
,
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across varieties. The marginal utility D(xi,x) is given
by
D(xi,x) = A(x) x
1/σ
i = A(x/xi),
where A(x) is the aggregate given by
A(x) ≡
￿ˆ N
0
x
σ−1
σ
j dj
￿−1/σ
.
We show below that our setting can easily be accommodated to cope with two more general
specifications of preferences.
The number of varieties as a consumption externality. In their 1974 working paper,
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) argued that the mass of varieties could enter the utility functional as a
specific argument.6 In this case, the number of available varieties has the nature of a consumption
externality generated by the entry of firms.
A well-known example is given by the augmented-CES, which is defined as follows:
U(x, N) ≡ N ν
￿ˆ N
0
x
σ−1
σ
i di
￿σ/(σ−1)
. (9)
In Benassy (1996), ν is a positive constant that captures the consumer benefit of a larger number
of varieties. The idea is to separate the love-for-variety eﬀect from the competition eﬀect generated
by the degree of product diﬀerentiation, which is inversely measured by σ. Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003) takes the opposite stance by assuming that ν = −1/σ(N) where σ(N) increases with N .
Under this specification, increasing the number of varieties does not raise consumer welfare but
intensifies competition among firms.
6Note that N can be written as a function of the consumption functional x in the following way N = µ{xi >
0, ∀i ≤ N}. However, this raises new issues regarding diﬀerentiability of the utility functional.
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Another example is the quadratic utility proposed by Shubik and Levitan (1971):
U(x, N) ≡ α
ˆ N
0
xidi− β
2
ˆ N
0
x2i di−
γ
2N
ˆ N
0
￿ˆ N
0
xi di
￿
xjdj. (10)
The diﬀerence between (8) and (10) is that the former may be rewritten as follows:
αX − β
2
ˆ N
0
x2i di−
γ
2
X2,
which is independent of N , whereas the latter becomes
αX − β
2
ˆ N
0
x2i di−
γ
2N
X2,
which ceteris paribus strictly increases with N .
Introducing N as an explicit argument in the utility functional U(x, N) may change the indif-
ference surfaces. Nevertheless, the analysis developed below remains valid in such cases. Indeed,
the marginal utility function D already includes N as an argument through the support of x, which
varies with N .
An example of asymmetric preferences. Assume that preferences are asymmetric in that
the utility functional U(x) is given by
U(x) = U˜(a · x), (11)
where U˜ is a symmetric functional that satisfies (2), a ∈ L2([0,N ]) a weight function, and a · x
the function (a · x)i ≡ aixi for all i ∈ [0,N ]. If xi = xj, ai > aj means that all consumers prefer
variety i to variety j, perhaps because the quality of i exceeds that of j.
The preferences (11) can be made symmetric by changing the units in which the quantities of
varieties are measured. Indeed, for any i, j ∈ [0,N ] the consumer is indiﬀerent between consuming
ai/aj units of variety i and one unit of variety j. Therefore, by using the change of variables
x˜i ≡ aixi and p˜i ≡ pi/ai, we can reformulate the consumer’s program as follows:
max
x˜
U˜(x˜) s.t.
ˆ N
0
p˜ix˜idi ≤ Y.
In this case, by rescaling of prices, quantities and costs by the weights ai, the model involves
symmetric preferences and heterogeneous firms, a setting we study in 5.2.
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2.2 Firms
There are increasing returns at the firm level, but no scope economies that would induce a firm
to produce several varieties. Each firm supplies a single variety and each variety is produced by
a single firm. Consequently, a variety may be identified by its producer i ∈ [0, N ]. Firms are
symmetric: to produce q units of its variety, a firm needs F + cq eﬃciency units of labor, which
means that firms share the same fixed cost F and the same marginal cost c. Being negligible to the
market, each firm chooses its output (or price) while accurately treating some market aggregates
as given. However, for the market to be in equilibrium, firms must accurately guess what these
market aggregates will be.
In monopolistic competition, unlike oligopolistic competition, working with quantity-setting
and price-setting firms yield the same market outcome (Vives, 1999). However, it turns out to
be convenient to assume that firms are quantity-setters because the scalar λ encapsulates all the
income eﬀects. Thus, firm i ∈ [0, N ] maximize its profits
π(qi) = (pi − c)qi − F (12)
with respect to its output qi subject to the inverse market demand function pi = LD/λ. Since
consumers share the same preferences, the consumption of each variety is the same across con-
sumers. Therefore, product market clearing implies qi = Lxi. Firm i accurately treats the market
aggregates N and λ, which are endogenous, parametrically.
3 Market equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the market outcome when the number N of firms is exogenously
given. This allows us to determine the equilibrium output, price and per variety consumption
conditional upon N . In the next section, the zero-profit condition pins down the equilibrium
number of firms.
When the number N of firms is given, a market equilibrium is given by the functions q¯(N),
p¯(N) and x¯(N) defined on [0, N ], which satisfy the following four conditions: (i) no firm i can
increase its profit by changing its output, (ii) each consumer maximizes her utility subject to her
budget constraint, (iii) the product market clearing condition
q¯i = Lx¯i for all i ∈ [0, N ]
and (iv) the labor market balance
c
ˆ N
0
qidi+NF = yL
12
hold.
3.1 Existence and uniqueness of a market equilibrium
The study of market equilibria, where the number of firms is exogenous, is to be viewed as an
intermediate step toward monopolistic competition, where the number of firms is endogenized by
free entry and exit. Since the focus is on symmetric free-entry equilibria, we find it reasonable to
study symmetric market equilibria, which means that the functions q¯(N), p¯(N) and x¯(N) become
scalars, i.e., q¯(N), p¯(N) and x¯(N). For this, consumers must have the same income, which holds
when profits are uniformly distributed across consumers. Therefore, the budget constraint (3)
must be replaced by the following expression:
ˆ N
0
pixidi = Y ≡ y + 1
L
ˆ N
0
πidi. (13)
Being negligible to the market, each firm accurately treats Y as a given.
Plugging D into (12), the program of firm i is given by
max
xi
π(xi,x) ≡
￿
D (xi,x)
λ
− c
￿
Lxi − F.
Setting
D￿i ≡
∂D(xi,x)
∂xi
D￿￿i ≡
∂D2(xi,x)
∂x2i
,
the first-order condition for profit-maximization are given by
D(xi,x) + xiD
￿
i = [1− η¯(xi,x)]D(xi,x) = λc, (14)
where
η¯(xi,x) ≡ −xi
D
D￿i
is the elasticity of the inverse demand for variety i. Note the diﬀerence with an oligopoly model: if
the number of firms were discrete and finite, firms should account for their impact on λ (see 4.2.4
for an illustration).
In what follows, we determine the market equilibrium for a given N . Since λ is endogenous,
we seek necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a unique (interior or corner) equilibrium to exist
regardless of the value of λc > 0. Indeed, finding conditions that depend upon c only turns out to
be a very cumbersome task. The argument involves three steps.
Step 1. For (14) to have at least one positive solution x¯(N) regardless of λc > 0, it is suﬃcient
to assume that, for any x, the following Inada conditions hold:
lim
xi→0
D =∞ lim
xi→∞
D = 0. (15)
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Indeed, since η¯(0,x) < 1, (15) implies that limxi→0(1 − η¯)D = ∞. Similarly, since 0 <
(1 − η¯)D < D, it ensues from (15) that limxi→∞(1 − η¯)D = 0. Because (1 − η¯)D is continuous,
it follows from the intermediate value theorem that (14) has at least one positive solution. Note
that (15) is suﬃcient, but not necessary. For example, if D displays a finite choke price exceeding
the marginal cost, it is readily verified that (14) has at least one positive solution.
Step 2. The first-order condition (14) is suﬃcient if the profit function π is strictly quasi-
concave in xi. If the maximizer of π is positive and finite, the profit function is strictly quasi-
concave in xi for any positive value of λc if and only if the second derivative of π is negative at
any solution to the first-order condition. Since firm i treats λ parametrically, the second-order
condition is given by
xiD
￿￿
i + 2D
￿
i < 0. (16)
This condition means that firm i’s marginal revenue (xiD￿i+D)L/λ is strictly decreasing in xi. It is
satisfied when D is concave, linear or not “too” convex in xi. Furthermore, (16) is also a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for the function π to be strictly quasi-concave for all λc > 0, for otherwise
there would exist a value λc such that the marginal revenue curve intersects the horizontal line λc
more than once.
Observe also that (16) means that the revenue function is strictly concave. Since the marginal
cost is independent of xi, this in turn implies that π is strictly concave in xi. In other words, when
firms are quantity-setters, the profit function π is quasi-concave in xi if and only if π is concave in
xi (see Appendix 4).
In sum, the profit function π is strictly quasi-concave in xi for all values of λc if and only if
(A) firm i’s marginal revenue decreases in xi.
We show in Appendix 4 that (A) is equivalent to the well-known condition obtained by Caplin
and Nalebuﬀ (1991) for a firm’s profits to be quasi-concave in its own price, i.e., the Marshallian
demand D is such that 1/D is convex in price. Since the Caplin-Nalebuﬀ condition is the least
stringent one for a firm’s profit to be quasi-concave under price-setting firms, (A) is therefore the
least demanding condition when firms compete in quantities.
Another suﬃcient condition commonly used in the literature is as follows (see, e.g., Krugman,
1979):
(Abis) the elasticity of the inverse demand η¯(xi, x) increases in xi.
It is readily verified that (Abis) is equivalent to
−xiD
￿￿
i
D
￿
i
< 1 + η¯.
whereas (16) is equivalent to
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−xiD
￿￿
i
D
￿
i
< 2.
Since η¯ < 1, (Abis) implies (A).
Step 3. Each firm facing the same demand and being negligible, the function π(xi,x) is the
same for all i. In addition, (A) implies that π(xi,x) has a unique maximizer for any x. As a result,
the market equilibrium must be symmetric.
Using πi ≡ (pi − c)Lxi − F , (13) boils down to labor market balance:
cL
ˆ N
0
xidi+ FN = yL,
which yields the only candidate symmetric equilibrium for the per variety consumption:
x¯(N) =
y
cN
− F
cL
. (17)
Therefore, x¯(N) is unique and positive if and only if N ≤ Ly/F . The product market clearing
condition implies that the candidate equilibrium output is
q¯(N) =
yL
cN
− F
c
. (18)
Plugging (18) into the profit maximization condition (22) shows that there is a unique candidate
equilibrium price given by
p¯(N) = c
σ (x¯(N), N)
σ (x¯(N), N)− 1 . (19)
Clearly, if N > Ly/F , there exists no interior equilibrium. Accordingly, we have the following
result: If (A) holds and N ≤ Ly/F , then there exists a unique market equilibrium. Furthermore,
this equilibrium is symmetric.
3.2 The elasticity of substitution
In this section, we define the elasticity of substitution, which will be central in our equilibrium
analysis. To this end, we extend the definition proposed by Nadiri (1982, p.442) to the case of a
continuum of goods.
Consider any two varieties i and j such that xi = xj = x. We show in Appendix 5 that the
elasticity of substitution between i and j, conditional on x, is given by
σ¯(x,x) = −D(x,x)
x
1
∂D(x,x)
∂x
=
1
η¯(x,x)
. (20)
Because the market outcome is symmetric, we may restrict the analysis to symmetric consump-
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tion profiles:
x = xI[0,N ]
and redefine η¯(xi,x) and σ¯(x,x) as follows:
η(x,N) ≡ η¯(x, xI[0,N ]) σ(x,N) ≡ σ¯(x, xI[0,N ]).
Furthermore, (20) implies that
σ(x,N) = 1/η(x,N). (21)
Hence, along the diagonal, our original functional analysis problem boils down into a two-dimensional
one.
Rewriting the equilibrium conditions (14) along the diagonal yields
m¯(N) ≡ p¯(N)− c
p¯(N)
= η(x¯(N), N) =
1
σ(x¯(N), N)
, (22)
while
π¯(N) ≡ (p¯(N)− c)q¯(N)
denotes the equilibrium operating profits made by a firm when there is a mass N of firms.
Importantly, (22) shows that, for any given N , the equilibrium markup m¯(N) varies inversely
with the elasticity of substitution. The intuition is easy to grasp. It is well know from industrial
organization that product diﬀerentiation relaxes competition. When the elasticity of substitution
is lower, varieties are worse substitutes, thereby endowing firms with more market power. It is,
therefore, no surprise that firms have a higher markup when σ is lower. It also follows from (22)
that the way σ varies with x and N shapes the market outcome. In particular, this demonstrates
that assuming a constant elasticity of substitution amounts to adding very strong restraints on the
way the market works.
Combining (17) and (19), we find that the operating profits are given by
π¯(N) =
cLx¯(N)
σ (x¯(N), N)− 1 . (23)
It is legitimate to ask how p¯(N) and π¯(N) vary with the mass of firms? There is no simple
answer to this question. Indeed, the expression (23) suﬃces to show that the way the market
outcome reacts to the entry of new firms depends on how the elasticity of substitution varies with
x and N . This confirms why static comparative statics under oligopoly yields ambiguous results.
Thus, to gain insights about the behavior of σ, we give below the elasticity of substitution for
the diﬀerent types of preferences discussed in the previous section.
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(i) When the utility is additive, we have:
1
σ(x,N)
= r(x) ≡ −xu
￿￿(x)
u￿(x)
, (24)
which means that σ depends only upon the per variety consumption when preferences are additive.
(ii) When the indirect utility is additive, it is shown in Appendix 6 that σ depends only upon
the total consumption X = Nx. Since the budget constraint implies X = Y/p, (22) may be
rewritten as follows:
1
σ(x,N)
= θ(X) ≡ − v
￿(1/X)
v￿￿(1/X)
X. (25)
(iii) When preferences are homothetic, it ensues from Proposition 2 that
1
σ(x,N)
= ϕ(N) ≡ η(1, N). (26)
For example, under translog preferences, we have
D(pi,p, Y (N)) = Y
pi
￿
1
N
+
β
N
ˆ N
0
ln pjdj − β ln pi
￿
.
Therefore, ϕ(N) = 1/(1 + βN).
Since both the direct and indirect CES utilities are additive, the elasticity of substitution is
constant. Furthermore, since the CES is also homothetic, it must be that
r(x) = θ(X) = ϕ(N) =
1
σ
.
It is, therefore, no surprise that the constant σ is the only demand side parameter that drives the
market outcome under CES preferences.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the CES is the sole function that belongs to the above three classes
of preferences. Furthermore, the expressions (24), (25) and (26) imply that the classes of additive,
indirectly additive and homothetic preferences are disjoint, expect for the CES that belongs to the
three of them.
By contrast, the entropy utility does not belong to any of these three classes of preferences.
Indeed, it is readily verified that
σ(x,N) = U ￿(Nx) + lnN,
which decreases with x, whereas σ(x,N) is decreasing, ∪-shaped or increasing in N .
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Fig. 1. The space of preferences
From now on, we consider the function σ(x,N) as the primitive of the model. There are
two reasons for making this choice. First, σ(x,N) portrays what preferences are along the diagonal
(xi = x > 0 for all i). As a result, what matters for the equilibrium is how σ(x,N) varies with x and
N . Second, the properties of the market outcome can be characterized by necessary and suﬃcient
conditions stated in terms of the elasticity of σ with respect to x and N , which are denoted Ex(σ)
and EN(σ). To be precise, the signs of these two expressions (Ex(σ) ≷ 0 and EN(σ) ≶ 0) and their
relationship (Ex(σ) ≷ EN(σ)) will allow us to characterize completely the market equilibrium.
How σ varies with x is a priori not clear. Marshall (1920, Book 3, Chapter IV) has argued
on intuitive grounds that the elasticity of the inverse demand η¯(xi,x) increases in sales.7 In our
setting, (20) shows that this assumption amounts to ∂σ¯(x,x)/∂x < 0. However, this inequality
does not tell us anything about the sign of ∂σ(x,N)/∂x because x refers here to the consumption
of all varieties. When preferences are additive, as in Krugman (1979), Marshall’s argument can
be applied because the marginal utility of a variety depends only upon its own consumption. But
this ceases to be true when preferences are non-additive. Nevertheless, as will be seen in Section
4.3, Ex(σ) < 0 holds if and only if the pass-through is smaller than 100%. The literature on
spatial pricing backs up this assumption, though it also recognizes the possibility of a pass-through
exceeding 100% (Greenhut et al., 1987).
We now come to the relationship between σ and N . The literature in industrial organization
suggests that varieties become closer substitutes when N increases, the reason being that adding
new varieties crowds out the product space (Salop, 1979; Tirole, 1988). Therefore, assuming
7We thank Peter Neary for having pointed out this reference to us.
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EN(σ) > 0 spontaneously comes to mind. As a consequence, the folk wisdom would be described
by the following two conditions:
Ex(σ) < 0 < EN(σ). (27)
However, these inequalities turn out to be more restrictive that what they might seem at
first glance. Indeed, they do not allow us to capture some interesting market eﬀects and fail to
encompass some standard models of monopolistic competition. For example, when preferences
are quadratic, Bertoletti and Epifani (2014) have pointed out that the elasticity of substitution
decreases with N :
σ(x,N) =
α− βx
βx
− γ
β
N.
This should not come as a surprise. Indeed, although spatial models of product diﬀerentiation
and models of monopolistic competition are not orthogonal to each other, they diﬀer in several
respects. In particular, when consumers are endowed with a love for variety, they are inclined to
spread their consumption over a wider range of varieties at the expense of their consumption of
each variety. By contrast, in spatial models every consumer has a unique ideal variety. Therefore,
providing a reconciliation of the two settings is not an easy task (Anderson et al., 1992). In what
follows, we propose to study the impact of N on σ under the assumption that a consumer’s total
consumption Nx is arbitrarily fixed, as in spatial models of product diﬀerentiation, while allowing
the per variety consumption x to vary with N , as in love-for-variety models.
In this case, it is readily verified that the following two relationships must hold simultaneously:
dx
x
= −dN
N
dσ
σ
=
∂σ
∂N
N
σ
dN
N
+
∂σ
∂x
x
σ
dx
x
.
Plugging the first expression into the second, we obtain
dσ
dN
￿￿￿￿
Nx=const
=
σ
N
(EN(σ)− Ex(σ)) .
In this event, the elasticity of substitution increases with N if and only if
Ex(σ) < EN(σ) (28)
holds. This condition is less stringent than ∂σ/∂N > 0 because it allows the elasticity of substitu-
tion to decrease with N . In other words, entry may trigger more diﬀerentiation, perhaps because
the incumbents react by adding new attributes to their products (Anderson et al., 1992). In addi-
tion, the evidence supporting the assumption Ex(σ) < 0 being mixed, we find it relevant to inves-
tigate the implications of the two cases, Ex(σ) > 0 and Ex(σ) < 0. Note that ∂σ/∂x = ∂σ/∂N = 0
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in the CES case only.
4 Symmetric monopolistic competition
In the previous section, we have determined the equilibrium price, output and consumption con-
ditional on the mass N of firms. Here, we pin down the equilibrium value of N by using the
zero-profit condition. Therefore, a consumer’s income is equal to her sole labor income: Y = y.
A symmetric free-entry equilibrium (SFE) is described by the vector (q∗, p∗, x∗, N∗), where N∗
solves the zero-profit condition
π¯(N) = F, (29)
while q∗ = q¯(N∗), p∗ = p¯(N∗) and x∗ = x¯(N∗). The Walras Law implies that the budget con-
straint N∗p∗x∗ = y is satisfied. Without loss of generality, we restrict ourselves to the domain of
parameters for which N∗ < N .
Combining (22) and (29), we obtain a single equilibrium condition given by
m¯(N) =
NF
Ly
, (30)
which means that, at the SFE, the equilibrium markup is equal to the share of the labor supply
spent on overhead costs. When preferences are non-homothetic, (17) and (19) show that L/F and
y enter the function m¯(N) as two distinct parameters. This implies that L and y have a diﬀerent
impact on the equilibrium markup, while a hike in L is equivalent to a drop in F .
4.1 Existence and uniqueness of a SFE
Diﬀerentiating (23) with respect to N , we obtain
π¯￿(N) = x¯￿(N)
d
dx
￿
cLx
σ (x, yL/(cLx+ F ))− 1
￿￿￿￿￿
x=x¯(N)
= − y
cN2
￿
σ − 1− x∂σ
∂x
+
cLx
cLx+ F
yL
cLx+ F
∂σ
∂N
￿￿￿￿￿
x=x¯(N)
.
Using (17) and (29), the second term in the right-hand side of this expression is positive if and
only if
Ex(σ) < σ − 1
σ
(1 + EN(σ)). (31)
Therefore, π¯￿(N) < 0 for all N if and only if (31) holds. This implies the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume (A). There exists a unique free-entry equilibrium for all c > 0 if and
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only if (31) holds. Furthermore, this equilibrium is symmetric.
Because the above proposition provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of
a SFE, we may safely conclude that the set of assumptions required to bring into play monopolistic
competition must include (31). Therefore, throughout the remaining of the paper, we assume that
(31) holds. This condition allows one to work with preferences that display a great of flexibility.
Indeed, σ may decrease or increase with x and/or N . To be precise, varieties may become better
or worse substitutes when the per variety consumption and/or the number of varieties rises, thus
generating either price-decreasing or price-increasing competition. Evidently, (31) is satisfied when
the folk wisdom conditions (27) hold.
Under additive preferences, (31) amounts to assuming that Ex(σ) < (σ − 1)/σ, which means
that σ cannot increase “too fast” with x. In this case, as shown by (30), there exists a unique SFE
and the markup function m(N) increases with N provided that the slope of m is smaller than
F/Ly. In other words, a market mimicking anti-competitive eﬀects need not preclude the existence
and uniqueness of a SFE (Zhelobodko et al., 2012). When preferences are homothetic, (31) holds
if and only if EN(σ) exceeds −1, which means that varieties cannot become too diﬀerentiated when
their number increases, which seems reasonable.
We consider (28) and (31) as our most preferred assumptions. The former, which states that
the impact of a change in the number of varieties on σ dominates the impact of a change in the
per variety consumption, points to the importance of the variety range for consumers, while the
latter is a necessary and suﬃcient for the existence and uniqueness of a SFE. Taken together, (28)
and (31) define a range of possibilities which is broader than the one defined by (27). We will
refrain from following an encyclopedic approach in which all cases are systematically explored.
However, since (28) need not hold for a SFE to exist, we will also explore what the properties of
the equilibrium become when this condition is not met. In so doing, we are able to highlight the
role played by (28) for some particular results to hold.
4.2 Comparative statics
In this subsection, we study the impact of a higher gross domestic product on the SFE. A higher
total income may stem from a larger population L, a higher per capita income y, or both. Next,
we will discuss the impact of firm’s productivity. To achieve our goal, it proves to be convenient
to work with the markup as the endogenous variable. Setting m ≡ FN/(Ly), we may rewrite the
equilibrium condition (30) as a function of m only:
mσ
￿
F
cL
1−m
m
,
Ly
F
m
￿
= F. (32)
Note that (32) involves the four structural parameters of the economy: L, y, c and F . Fur-
thermore, it is readily verified that the left-hand side of (32) increases with m if and only if (31)
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holds. Therefore, to study the impact of a specific parameter, we only have to find out how the
corresponding curve is shifted.
Before proceeding, we want to stress that we provide below a complete description of the
comparative static eﬀects through a series of necessary and suﬃcient conditions. Doing this allows
us to single out what seems to be the most plausible assumptions.
4.2.1 The impact of population size
Let us first consider the impact on the market price p∗. Diﬀerentiating (32) with respect to L, we
find that the right-hand side of (32) is shifted upwards under an increase in L if and only if (28)
holds. As a consequence, the equilibrium markup m∗, whence the equilibrium price p∗, decreases
with L. This is in accordance with Handbury and Weinstein (2013) who observe that the price
level for food products falls with city size. In this case, (32) implies that the equilibrium value of
σ increases, which amounts to saying that varieties get less diﬀerentiated in a larger market, very
much like in spatial models of product diﬀerentiation.
Second, the zero-profit condition implies that L always shifts p∗ and q∗ in opposite directions.
Therefore, firm sizes are larger in bigger markets, as suggested by the empirical evidence provided
by Manning (2010).
How does N∗ change with L? Diﬀerentiating (23) with respect to L, we have
∂π¯
∂L
￿￿￿￿
N=N∗
=
cx
σ (x,N)− 1 +
∂x¯(N)
∂L
∂
∂x
￿
cLx
σ (x,N)− 1
￿￿￿￿￿
x=x∗,N=N∗
. (33)
Substituting F for π¯(N∗) and simplifying, we obtain
∂π¯
∂L
￿￿￿￿
N=N∗
=
￿
cxσ
(σ − 1)3 (σ − 1− Ex(σ))
￿￿￿￿￿
x=x∗,N=N∗
.
Since the first term in the right-hand side of this expression is positive, (33) is positive if and only
if the following condition holds:
Ex(σ) < σ − 1. (34)
In this case, a population growth triggers the entry of new firms. Furthermore, restating (30)
as N/m(N) = Ly/F , it is readily verified that the increase in N∗is less proportional than the
population hike if and only if m￿(N) < 0, which is equivalent to (28).
Observe that (31) implies (34) when preferences are (indirectly) additive, while (34) holds true
under homothetic preferences because Ex(σ) = 0.
It remains to determine how the per variety consumption level x∗ varies with an increase in
population size. Combining (19) with the budget constraint x = y/(pN), we obtain
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Nxσ(x,N)
σ(x,N)− 1 =
y
c
. (35)
Note that L does not enter (35) as an independent parameter. Furthermore, it is straightforward
to check that the left-hand side of (35) increases with x when (34) holds, and decreases otherwise.
Combining this with the fact that (34) is also necessary and suﬃcient for an increase in L to trigger
additional entry, the per variety consumption level x∗ decreases with L if and only if the left-hand
side of (35) increases with N , or, equivalently, if and only if
EN(σ) < σ − 1. (36)
This condition holds if σ decreases with N or increases with N , but not “too fast,” which means
that varieties do not get too diﬀerentiated with the entry of new firms. Note also that (28) and
(36) imply (34). Evidently, (36) holds for (i) additive preferences, for in this case EN(σ) = 0, while
σ > 1; (ii) indirectly additive preferences, because, using (34) and σ(x,N) = 1/θ(xN), we obtain
1 + EN(σ) = 1 + Ex(σ) < σ; and (iii) any preferences such that σ weakly decreases with N .
The following proposition comprises a summary.
Proposition 4. If Ex(σ) is smaller than EN(σ), then a higher population size results in a
lower markup and larger firms. Furthermore, if (36) holds, the mass of varieties increases less
than proportionally with L, while the per variety consumption decreases with L.
Note that the mass of varieties need not rise with the population size. Indeed, N∗ falls when
EN(σ) exceeds σ− 1. In this case, increasing the number of firms makes varieties very close substi-
tutes, which strongly intensifies competition among firms. Under such circumstances, the benefits
associated with diversity are low, thus implying that consumers value more and more the volumes
they consume. This in turn leads a fraction of incumbents to get out of business.
When preferences are homothetic, σ depends upon N only. In this case, (35) boils down to
1 +
Nϕ￿(N)
1− ϕ(N) > 0.
When ϕ￿(N) < 0, this inequality need not hold. However, in the case of the translog where
ϕ(N) = 1/(1 + βN), (35) is satisfied, and thus x∗ decreases with L.
What happens when Ex(σ) > EN(σ)? In this event, (31) implies that (36) holds. Therefore,
the above necessary and suﬃcient conditions imply the following result: If Ex(σ) < EN(σ), then
a higher population size results in a higher markup, smaller firms, a more than proportional rise
in the mass of varieties, and a lower per variety consumption. As a consequence, a larger market
may generate anti-competitive eﬀects that take the concrete form of a higher market price and less
eﬃcient firms producing at a higher average cost. Such results are at odds with the main body of
industrial organization, which explains why (28) is one of our most preferred conditions.
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4.2.2 The impact of individual income
We now come to the impact of the per capita income on the SFE. One expects a positive shock
on y to trigger the entry of new firms because more labor is available for production. However,
consumers have a higher willingness-to-pay for the incumbent varieties and can aﬀord to buy each
of them in a larger volume. Therefore, the impact of y on the SFE is a priori ambiguous.
Diﬀerentiating (32) with respect to y, we see that the left-hand side of (32) is shifted downwards
by an increase in y if and only if EN(σ) > 0. In this event, the equilibrium markup decreases with
y.
To check the impact of y on N∗, we diﬀerentiate (23) with respect to y and get
∂π¯(N)
∂y
￿￿￿￿
N=N∗
=
￿
∂x¯(N)
∂y
∂
∂x
￿
cLx
σ (x,N)− 1
￿￿￿￿￿￿
x=x∗,N=N∗
.
After simplification, this yields
∂π¯(N)
∂y
￿￿￿￿
N=N∗
=
L
N
σ − 1− σEx(σ)
(σ − 1)2
￿￿￿￿
x=x∗,N=N∗
.
Hence, ∂π¯(N∗)/∂y > 0 if and only if the following condition holds:
Ex(σ) < σ − 1
σ
. (37)
Note that this condition is more stringent than (34). Thus, if EN(σ) > 0, then (37) implies (31).
As a consequence, we have:
Proposition 5. If EN(σ) > 0, then a higher per capita income results in a lower markup and
bigger firms. Furthermore, the mass of varieties increases with y if (37) holds, but decreases with
y otherwise.
Thus, when entry renders varieties less diﬀerentiated, the mass of varieties need not rise with
income. Indeed, the increase in per variety consumption may be too high for all the incumbents
to stay in business. The reason for this is that the decline in prices is suﬃciently strong for fewer
firms to operate at a larger scale. As a consequence, a richer economy need not exhibit a wider
array of varieties.
Evidently, if EN(σ) < 0, the markup is higher and firms are smaller when the income y rises.
Furthermore, (31) implies (37) so that N∗ increases with y. Indeed, since varieties get more
diﬀerentiated when entry arises, firms exploit consumers’ higher willingness-to-pay to sell less at
a higher price, which goes together with a larger mass of varieties.
Propositions 4 and 5 show that an increase in L is not a substitute for an increase in y and vice
versa, except, as shown below, in the case of homothetic preferences. This should not come as a
surprise because an increase in income aﬀects the shape of individual demands when preferences
are non-homothetic, whereas an increase in L shifts upward the market demand without changing
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its shape.
Finally, observe that using (indirectly) additive utilities allows capturing the eﬀects generated
by shocks on population size (income), but disregard the impact of the other magnitude. If
preferences are homothetic, it is well known that the eﬀects of L and y on the market variables p∗,
q∗ and N∗ are exactly the same. Indeed, m does not involve y as a parameter because σ depends
solely on N . Therefore, it ensues from (30) that the equilibrium price, firm size, and number of
firms depend only upon the total income yL.
4.2.3 The impact of firm productivity
Firms’ productivity is typically measured by their marginal costs. To uncover the impact on the
market outcome of a productivity shock common to all firms, we conduct a comparative static
analysis of the SFE with respect to c and show that the nature of preferences determines the
extent of the pass-through. In particular, we establish that the pass-through rate is lower than
100% if and only if σ decreases with x, i.e.
Ex(σ) < 0 (38)
holds. Evidently, the pass-through rate exceeds 100% when 0 < Ex(σ).
Figure 2 depicts (30). It is then straightforward to check that, when σ decreases with x, a drop
in c moves the vertical line rightward, while the p∗-locus is shifted downward. As a consequence,
the market price p∗ decreases with c. But by how much does p∗ decrease relative to c?
Ex(σ) < 0 Ex(σ) > 0
Fig. 2. Productivity and entry.
The left-hand side of (32) is shifted downwards under a decrease in c if and only if Ex(σ) < 0.
In this case, both the equilibrium markup m∗ and the equilibrium mass of firms N∗ = (yL/F ) ·m∗
increases with c. In other words, when Ex(σ) < 0, the pass-through rate is smaller than 1 because
varieties becomes more diﬀerentiated, which relaxes competition. On the contrary, when Ex(σ) > 0,
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the markup and the mass of firms decrease because varieties get less diﬀerentiated. In other words,
competition becomes so tough that p∗ decreases more than proportionally with c. In this event,
the pass-through rate exceeds 1.
Under homothetic preferences, (Ex(σ) = 0), p¯(N) is given by
p¯(N) =
c
1− ϕ(N) =⇒ m(N) = ϕ(N).
As a consequence, (30) does not involve c as a parameter. This implies that a technological shock
does aﬀect the number of firms. In other words, the markup remains the same regardless of the
productivity shocks, thereby implying that under homothetic preferences the pass-through rate
equal to 1.
The impact of technological shocks on firms’ size leads to ambiguous conclusions. For example,
under quadratic preferences, q∗ may increase and, then, decreases in response to a steadily drop
in c.
The following proposition comprises a summary.
Proposition 6. If the marginal cost of firms decreases, (i) the market price decreases and (ii)
the markup and number of firms increase if and only if (38) holds.
This proposition has an important implication. If the data suggest a pass-through rate smaller
than 1, then it must be that Ex(σ) < 0. In this case, (34) must hold while (31) is satisfied when
EN(σ) exceeds −1, thereby a bigger or richer economy is more competitive and more diversified
than a smaller or poorer one. Note that (31) does not restrict the domain of admissible values
of Ex(σ) for a pass-through rate to be smaller than 1, whereas (31) requires that Ex(σ) cannot
exceed (1 − 1/σ) (1 + EN(σ)). Recent empirical evidence shows that the pass-through generated
by a commodity tax or by trade costs need not be smaller than 1 (Martin, 2012, and Weyl and
Fabinger, 2013). Our theoretical argument thus concurs with the inconclusive empirical evidence:
the pass-through rate may exceed 1, although it is more likely to be less than 1.
Let us make a pause and summarize what our main results are. We have found necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a SFE (Proposition 3), and provided a
complete characterization of the eﬀect of a market size or productivity shock (Propositions 4 to
6). Observing that (27) implies (31), (28) and (37), we may conclude that a unique SFE exists
(Proposition 3), that a larger market or a higher income leads to lower markups, bigger firms and
a larger number of varieties (Propositions 4 and 5), and that the pass-through rate is smaller than
1 (Proposition 6) if (27) holds. Recall, however, that less stringent conditions are available for
each of the above-mentioned properties to be satisfied separately.
4.2.4 Monopolistic versus oligopolistic competition
It should be clear that Propositions 4-6 have the same nature as results obtained in similar compar-
ative analyses conducted in oligopoly theory (Vives, 1999). They may also replicate less standard
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anti-competitive eﬀects under some specific conditions (Chen and Riordan, 2008).
The markup (22) stems directly from preferences through the sole elasticity of substitution be-
cause we focus on monopolistic competition. However, in symmetric oligopoly models the markup
emerges as the outcome of the interplay between preferences and strategic interactions. Neverthe-
less, at least to a certain extent, both settings can be reconciled.
To illustrate, consider the case of an integer number N of quantity-setting firms and of an
arbitrary utility U(x1, ..., xN). The inverse demands are given by
pi =
Ui
λ
λ =
1
Y
N￿
j=1
xjUj.
Assume that firms do not manipulate consumers’ income through profit redistribution. Firm
i’s profit-maximization condition is then given by
pi − c
pi
= −xiUii
Ui
+ Exi(λ) = −
xiUii
Ui
+
xiUi +
￿N
j=1 xixjUij￿N
j=1 xjUj
. (39)
Set
ro(x,N) ≡ −xUii(x, ..., x)
Ui(x, ..., x)
rc(x,N) ≡ xUij(x, ..., x)
Ui(x, ..., x)
for j ￿= i.
The symmetry of preferences implies that ro(x,N) and rc(x,N) are independent of i and j.
Combining (39) with the symmetry condition xi = x, we obtain the markup condition:
p− c
p
=
1
N
+
￿
1− 1
N
￿
[ro(x,N) + rc(x,N)] . (40)
The elasticity of substitution sij between varieties i and j is given by (see Appendix 5)
sij = − UiUj(xiUj + xjUi)
xixj
￿
UiiU2j − 2UijUiUj + UjjU2i
￿ . (41)
When the consumption pattern is symmetric, (41) boils down to
s(x,N) =
1
ro(x,N) + rc(x,N)
. (42)
Combining (40) with (42), we get
p− c
p
=
1
N
+
￿
1− 1
N
￿
1
s(x,N)
. (43)
Unlike the profit-maximization condition (43), product and labor market balance, as well as
the zero-profit condition, do not depend on strategic considerations. Since
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p− c
p
=
1
σ(x,N)
(44)
under monopolistic competition, comparing (44) with (43) shows that the set of Cournot symmetric
free-entry equilibria is the same as the set of equilibria obtained under monopolistic competition if
and only if σ(x,N) is given by
1
σ(x,N)
=
1
N
+
￿
1− 1
N
￿
1
s(x,N)
.
As a consequence, by choosing appropriately the elasticity of substitution as a function of x
and N , monopolistic competition is able to replicate not only the direction of comparative static
eﬀects generated in symmetric oligopoly models with free entry, but also their magnitude. Hence,
we find it to say that monopolistic competition under non-separable preferences mimics oligopolistic
competition.
4.3 When is the SFE socially optimal?
The social planner faces the following optimization problem:
maxU(x) s.t. Ly = cL
ˆ N
0
xidi+NF.
The first-order condition with respect to xi implies that the problem may be treated using
symmetry, so that the above problem may be reformulated as maximizing
φ(x,N) ≡ U ￿xI[0,N ]￿
subject to Ly = N(cLx+ F ).
The ratio of the first-order conditions with respect to x and N leads to
φx
φN
=
NcL
cLx+ F
. (45)
It is well known that the comparison of the social optimum and market outcome leads to
ambiguous conclusions for the reasons provided by Spence (1976). We illustrate here this diﬃculty
in the special case of homothetic preferences. Without loss of generality, we can write φ(N, x) as
follows:
φ(N, x) = Nψ(N)x,
where ψ(N) is an increasing function of N . In this event, we get φxx/φ = 1 and φNN/φ =
1 +Nψ￿/ψ. Therefore, (45) becomes
EN(ψ) = F
cLx
,
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while the market equilibrium condition (30) is given by
ϕ(N)
1− ϕ(N) =
F
cLx
.
The social optimum and the market equilibrium are identical if and only if
EN(ψ) = ϕ(N)
1− ϕ(N) . (46)
It should be clear that this condition is unlikely to be satisfied unless strong restrictions are
imposed on the utility. To be concrete, denote by A(N) the solution to
EN(A) + EN(ψ) = ϕ(N)
1− ϕ(N) ,
which is unique up to a positive coeﬃcient. It is then readily verified that (46) holds for all N if and
only if φ(x,N) is replaced with A(N)φ(x,N). Thus, contrary to the folk wisdom, the equilibrium
and the optimum may be the same for utility functions that diﬀer from the CES (Dhingra and
Morrow, 2013). This finding has an unexpected implication.
Proposition 7. If preferences are homothetic, there exists a consumption externality for which
the equilibrium and the optimum coincide regardless of the values taken by the parameters of the
economy.
Hence, the choice of a particular consumption externality has subtle welfare implications, which
are often disregarded in the literature. For example, if we multiply A(N) by N ν , where ν is a
constant, there is growing under-provision of varieties when the diﬀerence ν− 1/(σ − 1) < 0 falls,
and growing over-provision when ν− 1/(σ − 1) > 0 rises. This has the following unsuspected
implication: preferences given by A(N)φ(x,N) are cardinal in nature. Indeed, taking a power
transformation of N νφ(x,N) makes the discrepancy between the equilibrium and the optimum
can be made arbitrarily large or small by choosing the appropriate value of the exponent ν.
5 Extensions
In this section, we extend our baseline model to heterogeneous firms. We then consider the case
of a multisector economy and conclude with a discussion of a setting in which consumers are
heterogeneous.
5.1 Heterogeneous firms
It is natural to ask whether the approach developed in this paper can cope with Melitz-like het-
erogeneous firms? In what follows, we consider the one-period framework used by Melitz and
29
Ottaviano (2008), the mass of potential firms being given by N . Prior to entry, risk-neutral firms
face uncertainty about their marginal cost while entry requires a sunk cost Fe. Once this cost is
paid, firms observe their marginal cost drawn randomly from the continuous probability distri-
bution Γ(c) defined over R+. After observing its type c, each entrant decides to produce or not,
given that an active firm must incur a fixed production cost F . Under such circumstances, the
mass of entrants, Ne, typically exceeds the mass of operating firms, N . Even though varieties are
diﬀerentiated from the consumer’s point of view, firms sharing the same marginal cost c behave
in the same way and earn the same profit at equilibrium. As a consequence, we may refer to any
variety/firm by its c-type only.
The equilibrium conditions are as follows:
(i) the profit-maximization condition for c-type firms:
max
xc
Πc(xc,x) ≡
￿
D (xc,x)
λ
− c
￿
Lxc − F ; (47)
(ii) the zero-profit condition for the cutoﬀ firm:
(pc¯ − c¯)qc¯ = F,
where c¯ is the cutoﬀ cost. As will be shown below, firms are sorted out by decreasing order of
productivity, which implies that the mass of active firms is equal to N ≡ NeΓ(c¯);
(iii) the product market clearing condition:
qc = Lxc
for all c ∈ [0, c¯];
(iv) the labor market clearing condition:
Ne
￿
Fe +
ˆ c¯
0
(cqc + F )dΓ(c)
￿
= yL,
where Ne is the number of entrants;
(v) firms enter the market until their expected profits net of the entry cost Fe are zero:
ˆ c¯
0
Πc(xc,x)dΓ(c) = Fe.
When ci > cj, (47) implies￿
D (xci ,x)
λ
− ci
￿
Lxi <
￿
D (xci ,x)
λ
− cj
￿
Lxci ,
so that there is perfect sorting across firms’ types at any equilibrium, while firms with a higher
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productivity earn higher profits.
It also follows from (47) that pc [1− η¯(xc,x)] = c. Combining this with the inverse demands
yields
D(xc,x) [1− η¯(xc,x)] = λc. (48)
Dividing (48) for a type-ci firm by the same expression for a type-cj firm, we obtain
D(xci ,x) [1− η¯(xci ,x)]
D(xcj ,x)
￿
1− η¯(xcj ,x)
￿ = ci
cj
. (49)
The condition (A) of Section 3 means that, for any given x, a firm’s marginal revenueD(x,x) [1− η¯(x,x)]
decreases with x. Therefore, it ensues from (49) that xi > xj if and only if ci < cj. In other words,
more eﬃcient firms produce more than less eﬃcient firms. Furthermore, since pi = D(x,x)/λ and
D decreases in x for any given x, more eﬃcient firms sell at lower prices than less eﬃcient firms.
As for the markups, (49) yields
pi/ci
pj/cj
=
1− η¯(xcj ,x)
1− η¯(xci ,x)
.
Consequently, more eﬃcient firms enjoy higher markups – a regularity observed in the data (De
Loecker and Warzynski, 2012) – if and only if η¯(x,x) increases with x, i.e., (Abis) holds (see
Section 3.1).
The following proposition is a summary.
Proposition 8. Assume that firms are heterogeneous. If (A) holds, then more eﬃcient firms
produce larger outputs, charge lower prices and earn higher profits than less eﬃcient firms. Fur-
thermore, more eﬃcient firms have higher markups if (Abis) holds, but lower markups otherwise.
From now on, we assume that, for any c¯ and Ne, there exists a unique equilibrium x¯(c¯, Ne) of
the quantity game. Since the distribution G is given, the profit-maximization condition implies
that x∗ is entirely determined by c¯ and Ne. In other words, regardless of the nature of preferences
and the distribution of marginal costs, the heterogeneity of firms amounts to replacing the variable
N by the two variables c¯ and Ne. As for x, it is replaced by c because the c-type firms sell at a
price that depends on c, thus making c-specific the consumption of the corresponding varieties. As
a consequence, the complexity of the problem goes from two to three dimensions. The equilibrium
operating profits of the quantity game may thus be written as follows:
Π∗c(c¯, Ne) ≡ maxxc
￿
D (xc,x∗(c¯, Ne))
λ (x∗(c¯, Ne))
− c
￿
Lxc.
We have seen that Π∗c(c¯, Ne) decreases with c. In what follows, we impose the additional two
conditions that rule out anti-competitive market outcomes.
(B) The equilibrium profit of each firm’s type decreases in c¯ and Ne.
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The intuition behind this assumption is easy to grasp: a larger number of entrants or a higher
cutoﬀ leads to lower profits, for, in both cases, the mass of active firms N rises. To illustrate,
consider first the case of CES preferences where the equilibrium profits are given by
Π∗c(c¯, Ne) =
yL
σNe
c1−σ´ c¯
0 z
1−σdG(z)
, (50)
which implies (B). More generally, using Zhelobodko et al. (2012), it is readily verified that any
additive preference satisfies (B). The same holds for indirectly additive preferences. To see this,
observe that (50) boils down to
Π∗c(c¯, Ne) =
yL
Ne
v￿(p¯(c, y)/y) [p¯(c, y)− c]´ c¯
0 v
￿(p¯(z, y)/y)p¯(c, y)dG(z)
, (51)
where p¯(c, y) is the c-type firm profit-maximizing price solving the first-order condition p(1 −
θ(y/p)) = c. Clearly, (B) follows from (51).
In what follows, we assume that, for any c¯ and Ne, there exists a unique equilibrium x¯(c¯, Ne)
of the quantity game and allow for the endogenous determination of c¯ and Ne.
Free-entry equilibria. A free-entry equilibrium with heterogeneous firms is defined by a pair
(c¯∗, N∗e ) that satisfies the zero-expected-profit condition for each firm
ˆ c¯
0
[Π∗c(c¯, Ne)− F ] dΓ(c) = Fe, (52)
as well as the cutoﬀ condition
Π∗c¯(c¯, Ne) = F. (53)
Dividing (52) by (53) yields the following new equilibrium condition:
ˆ c¯
0
￿
Π∗c(c¯, Ne)
Π∗¯c(c¯, Ne)
− 1
￿
dΓ(c) =
Fe
F
. (54)
Let c¯ = g(Ne) be the locus of solutions to (53) and c¯ = h(Ne) the locus of solutions to (54).8 A
free-entry equilibrium is thus an intersection point of the two loci c¯ = g(Ne) and c¯ = h(Ne) in the
(Ne, c¯)-plane. As implied by (B), g(Ne) is downward-sloping in the (Ne, c¯)-plane. Furthermore,
it is shifted upward when L rises. As for h(Ne), it is independent of L but its slope is a priori
undetermined. Yet, we will see that the sign of the slope of h(Ne) is critical for the impact of a
population hike on the cutoﬀ cost.
Three cases may arise. First, if the locus h(Ne) is upward-sloping, there exists a unique free-
8We give below suﬃcient conditions for the left-hand side of (54) to be monotone in c¯ and Ne, two conditions
that garantee that the locus c¯ = h(Ne) is well defined.
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entry equilibrium, and this equilibrium is stable. Furthermore, both N∗e and c¯∗ increase with L
(see Figure 3a). Let us now rotate the locus h(Ne) in a clockwise manner, so that h(Ne) gets less
and less steep. The second case, which corresponds to the CES preferences, arises when h(Ne) is
horizontal, which implies that N∗e rises with L while c¯∗ remains constant.
Fig. 3a. Cutoﬀ and market size
Last, when h(Ne) is downward-sloping, two subcases must be distinguished. In the first one,
h(Ne) is less steep than g(Ne). As a consequence, there still exists a unique free-entry equilibrium. This
equilibrium is stable and such that N∗e increases with L, but c¯∗ now decreases with L (see Figure
3b). In the second subcase, h(Ne) is steeper than g(Ne), which implies that the equilibrium is
unstable because h(Ne) intersects g(Ne) from below. In what follows, we focus only upon stable
equilibria.
Fig. 3b. Cutoﬀ and market size
In sum, we end up with the following properties of the free-entry equilibrium: (i) the equilibrium
mass of entrants always increases with L but (ii) the equilibrium cutoﬀ cost may increase or
decrease with L.
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When firms are symmetric, we have seen that the sign of EN(σ(x,N)) plays a critical role in
comparative statics. The same holds here. The diﬀerence is that the mass of active firms is now
determined by c¯ and Ne because N = Γ(c¯)Ne. As a consequence, how the mass of active firms
responds to a population hike depends on the way the left-hand side of (54) varies with c¯ and Ne.
To this end, we will rewrite the left-hand side of (54) in terms of the elasticity of substitution.
Observe, first, that the equilibrium profit of a type-c firm gross of the fixed cost F is given by
Π∗c(c¯, Ne) =
c
σc(c¯, Ne)− 1q
∗
c
where σc(c¯, Ne) is the equilibrium value of the elasticity of substitution between any two c-type
firms given by
σc(c¯, Ne) ≡ σ¯(x∗c ,x∗(c¯, Ne)).
Using the envelope theorem and the profit-maximization condition (47), we obtain:
Ec (Π∗c(c¯, Ne)) = 1− σc(c¯, Ne). (55)
Since
−
ˆ c¯
c
Ez (Π∗z(c¯, Ne))
z
dz = −
ˆ c¯
c
∂ lnΠ∗z(c¯, Ne)
∂z
dz = lnΠ∗c(c¯, Ne)− lnΠ∗c¯(c¯, Ne),
it follows from (55) that
lnΠ∗c(c¯, Ne)
lnΠ∗¯c(c¯, Ne)
=
ˆ c¯
c
σz(c¯, Ne)− 1
z
dz.
Accordingly, (54) may rewritten as follows:
ˆ c¯
0
￿
exp
￿ˆ c¯
c
σz(c¯, Ne)− 1
z
dz
￿
− 1
￿
dΓ(c) =
Fe
F
. (56)
Therefore, if σc(c¯, Ne) increases with c¯, the left-hand side of (54) increases with c¯. Intuitively,
when c¯ increases, the mass of firms rises as less eﬃcient firms stay in business, which intensifies
competition and lowers markups. In this case, the selection process is tougher. This is not the end
of the story, however. Indeed, the competitiveness of the market also depends on how Ne aﬀects
the degree of diﬀerentiation across varieties.
The expression (56) shows that the left-hand side of (54) increases with Ne if and only if
σc(c¯, Ne) increases in Ne. This amounts to assuming that, for any given cutoﬀ, the relative impact
of entry on the low-productivity firms (i.e., the small firms) is larger than the impact on the high-
productivity firms, the reason being that Ec (Π∗c(c¯, Ne)) decreases in Ne if and only if σc(c¯, Ne)
increases in Ne.
When σc(c¯, Ne) increases both with c¯ and Ne, the locus h(Ne) is downward-sloping. Indeed,
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when Ne rises, so does the left-hand side of (56). Hence, since σc(c¯, Ne) also increases with c¯, it
must be that c¯ decreases for (56) to hold. As a consequence, we have:
Claim 1. Assume (B). If σc(c¯, Ne) increases with c¯ and Ne, then c¯∗ decreases with L.
Given c¯, the number of active firms N is proportional to the number of entrants Ne. Therefore,
assuming that σ(c¯, Ne) increases with Ne may be considered as the counterpart of one of our most
preferred assumptions in the case of symmetric firms, that is, σ(x,N) increases with N . In this
case, the pro-competitive eﬀect generated by entry exacerbates the selection eﬀect across firms.
In response to a hike in L, the two eﬀects combine to induce the exit of the least eﬃcient active
firms. This echoes Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) who show that a trade liberalization shock gives
rise to a similar eﬀect under quadratic preferences. Since N∗e and c¯∗ move in opposite directions,
it is hard to predict how L aﬀects the equilibrium mass N∗ of active firms. Indeed, how strong are
the entry and selection eﬀects depends on the elasticity of substitution and the distribution G.
Repeating the above argument shows that, when σc(c¯, Ne) increases with c¯ and decreases with
Ne, the locus h(Ne) is upward-sloping. In this event, we have:
Claim 2. Assume (B). If σc(c¯, Ne) increases with c¯ and decreases with Ne, then c¯∗ increases
with L.
When σc(c¯, Ne) decreases with Ne, two opposing eﬀects are at work. First, entry fosters product
diﬀerentiation, and thus relaxes competition. This invites new firms to enter and allows less eﬃcient
firms to stay in business. On the other hand, the corresponding hike in c¯ tends to render varieties
closer substitutes. What our result shows is that the former eﬀect dominates the latter. Hence,
the equilibrium mass of active firms N∗ = Γ(c¯∗)N∗e unambiguously rises with L.
To conclude, the impact of population size on the number of entrants is unambiguous: a larger
market invites more entry. By contrast, the cutoﬀ cost behavior depends on how the elasticity of
substitution varies with Ne. All if this shows that the interaction between the entry and selection
eﬀects is non-trivial.9
Finally, by reformulating the game with price-setting firms, the same comparative statics anal-
ysis can be undertaken to study how the per capita income aﬀects the market outcome.
Pass-through. We show here that the result on complete pass-through under homothetic pref-
erences still holds when firms are heterogeneous. The first-order condition for a c-type firm is given
by
pc − c
pc
= η¯(xc,x). (57)
Consider a proportionate drop in marginal costs by a factor µ > 1, so that the distribution
of marginal costs is given by G(µc). We first investigating the impact of µ on firms’ operating
9Note that we do not say anything about the impact on the aggregate productivity. This one will depend upon
the aggregation weights chosen, as well on the distribution of firms’ types, which is here unspecified.
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profits when the cutoﬀ c¯ is unchanged. The cutoﬀ firms now have a marginal cost equal to c¯/µ.
Furthermore, under homothetic preferences, η¯(xc,x) does not depend on the income y and is
positive homogeneous of degree 0. Therefore, (57) is invariant to the same proportionate reduction
in c. As a consequence, the new price equilibrium profile over [0, c¯] is obtained by dividing all
prices by µ.
We now show that the profits of the c¯-type firms do not change in response to the drop in
cost, so that the new cutoﬀ is given by c¯/µ. Indeed, both marginal costs and prices are divided
by µ, while homothetic preferences imply that demands are shifted upwards by the same factor µ.
Therefore, the operating profit of the c¯-type firms is unchanged because￿
pc¯
µ
− c¯
µ
￿
Lµxc¯ = (pc¯ − c¯)Lxc¯ = F.
In sum, regardless of the cost distribution, under homothetic preferences the equilibrium price
distribution changes in proportion with the cost distribution, thereby leaving unchanged the distri-
bution of equilibrium markups, as in Proposition 6.
5.2 Multisector economy
Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), we consider a two-sector economy involving a diﬀerentiated
good supplied under increasing returns and monopolistic competition, and a homogeneous good
- or a Hicksian composite good - supplied under constant returns and perfect competition. Both
goods are normal. Labor is the only production factor and is perfectly mobile between sectors.
Consumers share the same preferences given by U(U(x), z) where the functional U(x) satisfies the
properties stated in Section 2, while z is the consumption of the homogeneous good. The upper-
tier utility U is strictly quasi-concave, once continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing in each
argument, and such that the demand for the diﬀerentiated product is always positive.10
We choose the unit of the homogeneous good for its equilibrium price to be equal to 1. The
budget constraint is now given by
ˆ N
0
pixidi+ z = E + z = Y,
where the expenditure E on the diﬀerentiated good is endogenous because competition across firms
aﬀects the relative price of this good.
Using the first-order condition for utility maximization yields
pi =
U ￿1(U(x), z)
U ￿2(U(x), z)
D(xi, x).
10Our results hold true if the choke price is finite but suﬃciently high.
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Let p be arbitrarily given. Along the diagonal xi = x, this condition becomes
p = S(φ(x,N), z)D(x, xI[0,N ]), (58)
where S is the marginal rate of substitution between the diﬀerentiated and homogeneous goods:
S(φ, z) ≡ U
￿
1(φ(x,N), z)
U ￿2(φ(x,N), z)
and φ(x,N) ≡ U ￿xI[0,N ]￿.
The quasi-concavity of the upper-tier utility U implies that the marginal rate of substitution
decreases with φ(x,N) and increases with z. Therefore, for any given (p, x,N), (58) has a unique
solution z¯(p, x,N), which is the income-consumption curve. The two goods being normal, this
curve is upward sloping in the plane (x, z).
For any given xi = x, the love for variety implies that the utility level increases with the number
of varieties. However, it is reasonable to suppose that the marginal utility D of an additional variety
decreases. To be precise, we assume that
(C) for all x > 0, the marginal utility D weakly decreases with the number of varieties.
Observe that (C) holds for additive and quadratic preferences. Since φ(x,N) increases in N ,
S decreases. As D weakly decreases in N , it must be that z increases for the condition (58) to be
satisfied. In other words, z¯(p, x,N) increases in N .
We now determine the relationship between x and m by using the zero-profit condition. Since
by definition m ≡ (p− c)/p, for any given p the zero-profit and product market clearing conditions
yield the per variety consumption as a function of m only:
x =
F
cL
1−m
m
. (59)
Plugging (59) and p = c/(1 −m) into z¯, we may rewrite z¯(p, x,N) as a function of m and N
only:
zˆ(m,N) ≡ z¯
￿
c
1−m,
F
cL
1−m
m
, N
￿
.
Plugging (59) and p = c/(1−m) into the budget constraint (3) and solving for N yields
N =
Lm
F
[Y − zˆ(m,N)] . (60)
Since z¯ and zˆ vary with N identically, zˆ also increases in N . Therefore, (60) has a unique solution
Nˆ(m;Y ) for any m ∈ [0, 1].
Moreover, (60) implies that ∂Nˆ/∂Y > 0, while ∂Nˆ/∂L > 0 because the income-consumption
curve is upward-sloping. In other words, if the price of the diﬀerentiated product is exogenously
given, an increase in population size or individual income leads to a wider range of varieties.
37
Since Nˆ(m;Y ) is the number of varieties in the two-sector economy, while Y = y because profits
are zero at any SFE, the equilibrium condition (32) is to be replaced by the following expression:
mσ
￿
F
cL
1−m
m
, Nˆ(m)
￿
= 1. (61)
The left-hand side mσ of (61) equals zero for m = 0 and exceeds 1 when m = 1. Hence,
by the intermediate value theorem, the set of SFEs is non-empty. Moreover, it has an infimum
and a supremum, which are both SFEs because the left-hand side of (61) is continuous. In what
follows, we denote the corresponding markups by minf and msup; if the SFE is unique, minf = msup.
Therefore, the left-hand side of (61) must increase with m in some neighborhood of minf , for
otherwise there would be an equilibrium to the left of minf , a contradiction. Similarly, the left-
hand side of (61) increases with m in some neighborhood of msup.
Since ∂Nˆ/∂y > 0, (61) implies that an increase in y shifts the locus mσ upward if and only
if EN(σ) > 0, so that the equilibrium markups minf and msup decrease in y. Consider now an
increase in population size. Since ∂Nˆ/∂L > 0, (61) implies that an increase in L shifts the locus
mσ upward if both Ex(σ) < 0 and EN(σ) > 0 hold. In this event, the equilibrium markups minf
and msup decrease in L.
Summarizing our results, we come to a proposition.
Proposition 9. Assume (C). Then, the set of SFEs is non-empty. Furthermore, (i) an increase
in individual income leads to a lower markup and bigger firms at the infimum and supremum SFEs
if and only if EN(σ) > 0 and (ii) an increase in population size yields a lower markup and bigger
firms at the infimum and supremum SFEs if Ex(σ) < 0 and EN(σ) > 0.
This extends to a two-sector economy what Propositions 4 and 5 state in the case of a one-
sector economy where the SFE is unique. Proposition 8 also shows that the elasticity of substitution
keeps its relevance for studying monopolistic competition in a multisector economy. In contrast,
studying how N∗ changes with L or y is more problematic because the equilibrium number of
varieties depends on the elasticity of substitution between the diﬀerentiated and homogeneous
goods.
5.3 Heterogeneous consumers
Accounting for consumer heterogeneity in models of monopolistic competition is not easy but
doable. Assume that each consumer is characterized by a labor endowment y ≥ 0, which need not
be the same across consumers, and some taste parameter θ belonging to the range Θ. Let G be
the joint probability distribution of labor endowment y and taste θ over R+×Θ. In what follows,
we call G the income-taste distribution.
Let D(pi,p;Y, θ) be the Marshallian demand for variety i of a consumer with θ-type preference
where θ is the taste parameter. When a consumer’s income is equal to y, the aggregate demand
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faced by firm i is given by
∆(pi,p) ≡ L
ˆ
R+×Θ
D(pi,p; y, θ)dG(y, θ). (62)
Ever since the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, ch.17), it is well
known that the aggregate demand (62) need not inherit the properties of the individual demand
functions. By contrast, as in Section 2, for each variety i, the aggregate demand ∆(pi,p) for variety
i is decreasing in pi regardless of the income-taste distribution G. A comparison with Hildenbrand
(1983) and Grandmont (1987), who derived specific conditions for the Law of demand to hold
when the number of goods is finite, shows how working with a continuum of goods, which need
not be the varieties of a diﬀerentiated product, vastly simplifies the analysis.
The properties of D crucially depend on the relationship between income and taste. Indeed,
since firm i’s profit is given by π(pi,p) = (pi − c)∆(pi,p) − F , the first-order condition for a
symmetric equilibrium becomes
p
￿
1− 1
ε(p,N)
￿
= c,
where ε(p,N) is the elasticity of ∆(p,p) evaluated at the symmetric outcome. If ε(p,N) is an
increasing function of p and N , most of the results derived above hold true. Indeed, integrating
consumers’ budget constraints across R+ × Θ and applying the zero-profit condition yields the
markup.
m(N) =
NF
Ly¯
where y¯ ≡
ˆ
R+×Θ
ydG(y, θ). (63)
Note that (63) diﬀers from (30) only in one respect: the individual labor income y is replaced
by the mean income y¯, which is independent of L. Consequently, if ε(p,N) decreases both with
p and N , a population hike or a productivity shock aﬀects the SFE as in the baseline model (see
Propositions 4 and 6). By contrast, the impact of an increase in y¯ is ambiguous because it depends
on how θ and y are related through the distribution G.
There is no reason to expect the aggregate demand to exhibit an increasing price elasticity
even when the individual demands satisfy this property. To highlight the nature of this diﬃculty,
we show in Appendix 7 that
∂ε(p,N)
∂p =
´
R+×Θ
∂ε(p,N ; y,θ)
∂p s(p,N ; y, θ)dG(y, θ)−
−1p
´
R+×Θ [ε(p,N ; y, θ)− ε(p,N)]
2 s(p,N ; y, θ)dG(y, θ),
(64)
where ε(p,N ; y, θ) is the elasticity of the individual demand D(pi,p; y, θ) evaluated at a symmetric
outcome (pi = pj = p), while s(p,N ; y, θ) stands for the share of demand of (y, θ)-type consumers
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in the aggregate demand, evaluated at the same symmetric outcome:
s(p,N ; y, θ) ≡ D(p,p; y, θ)
∆(p,p)
￿￿￿￿
p=pI[0,N ]
. (65)
Because the second term of (64) is negative, the market demand may exhibit decreasing price
elasticity even when individual demands display increasing price elasticities. Nevertheless, (64)
has an important implication.
Proposition 10. If individual demand elasticities are increasing and their variance is not too
large, then the elasticity of the aggregate demand is increasing, and thus there exists a unique
symmetric free-entry equilibrium.
In this case, all the properties of Section 4 hold true because the elasticity of the aggregate
demand satisfies (Abis). Yet, when consumers are very dissimilar, like in the Sonnenschein-Mantel-
Debreu theorem, the aggregate demand may exhibit undesirable properties.
The equation (64) shows that the eﬀect of heterogeneity in tastes and income generally diﬀer.
In particular, consumers with diﬀerent incomes and identical tastes have diﬀerent willingness-to-
pay for the same variety, which increases the second term in (64). By contrast, if consumers have
the same income and only diﬀer in their ideal variety, one may expect the second term in (64) to
be close to zero when the market provides these varieties.
The main issue regarding consumer heterogeneity is to study how diﬀerent types of consumer
heterogeneity aﬀect the variance of the distribution of individual elasticities. A first step in this
direction has been taken by Di Comite et. al. (2014) who show how the main ingredients of
Hotelling’s approach to product diﬀerentiation - i.e. taste heterogeneity across consumers who
have each a diﬀerent ideal variety - can be embedded into the quadratic utility while preserving
the properties of this model.
6 Concluding remarks
We have shown that monopolistic competition can be modeled in a much more general way than
what is typically thought. Using the concept of elasticity of substitution, we have provided a
complete characterization of the market outcome and of all the comparative statics implications in
terms prices, firm size, and mass of firms/varieties. Somewhat ironically, the concept of elasticity
of substitution, which has vastly contributed to the success of the CES model of monopolistic
competition, thus keeps its relevance in the case of general preferences, both for symmetric and
heterogeneous firms. The fundamental diﬀerence is that the elasticity of substitution ceases to be
constant and now varies with the key-variables of the setting under study. We take leverage on
this to make clear-cut predictions about the impact of market size and productivity shocks on the
market outcome.
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Furthermore, our framework is able to mimic a wide range of strategic eﬀects usually captured
by oligopoly models, and it does so without encountering several of the diﬃculties met in general
equilibrium under oligopolistic competition. Finally, we have singled out our most preferred set
of assumptions and given a disarmingly simple suﬃcient condition for all the desired comparative
statics eﬀects to hold true. But we have also shown that relaxing these assumptions does not jeop-
ardize the tractability of the model. Future empirical studies should shed light on the plausibility
of the assumptions discussed in this paper by checking their respective implications. It would be
unreasonable, however, to expect a single set of conditions to be universally valid.
We would be the last to say that monopolistic competition is able to replicate the rich array
of findings obtained in industrial organization. However, it is our contention that models such as
those presented in this paper may help avoiding several of the limitations imposed by the partial
equilibrium analyses of oligopoly theory. Although we acknowledge that monopolistic competition
is the limit of oligopolistic equilibria, we want to stress that monopolistic competition may be used
in diﬀerent settings as a substitute for oligopoly models when these ones appear to be unworkable.
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Appendix
Appendix 1. If the set B ∈ L2[0, N ] is convex and weakly compact, while the functional U : B →
R is Frechet-diﬀerentiable and strictly quasi-concave, then U has a unique maximizer x∗ ∈ B.
Proof. Existence is implied by the following two results: (i) a quasi-concave Frechet-diﬀerentiable
functional is weakly upper-semicontinuous (Barbu and Precupanu, 2012), and (ii) an upper-
semicontinuous functional defined over a bounded weakly closed subset of a reflexive Banach space
always has a maximizer (Céa, 1971). Indeed, a weakly compact set is bounded and weakly closed,
while L2[0, N ] is a Hilbert space, thus a reflexive Banach space. Uniqueness follows from the strict
quasi-concavity of U and the convexity of B. Q.E.D.
Appendix 2. Proof of Proposition 1.
(i) We first show (1) for the case where N/k is a positive integer. Note that
1[0,N ] =
N/k￿
i=1
1[(i−1)k, ik] (A.1)
while symmetry implies
U
￿
X
k
1[(i−1)k, ik]
￿
= U
￿
X
k
1[0,k]
￿
for all i ∈ {2, ..., N/k}. (A.2)
Together with quasi-concavity, (A.1) – (A.2) imply
U
￿
X
N
1[0,N ]
￿
= U
 k
N
N/k￿
i=1
X
k
1[(i−1)k, ik]
 > min
i
U
￿
X
k
1[(i−1)k, ik]
￿
= U
￿
X
k
1[0,k]
￿
.
Thus, (1) holds when N/k is a positive integer.
(ii) We now extend this argument to the case where N/k is a rational number. Let r/s, where
both r and s are positive integers and r ≥ s, be the irredundant representation of N/k. It is then
readily verified that
s1[0,N ] =
r￿
i=1
1[N{(i−1)k/N}, N{ik/N}] (A.3)
and
U
￿
X
k
1[N{(i−1)k/N}, N{ik/N}]
￿
= U
￿
X
k
1[0,k]
￿
for all i ∈ {2, ..., r} (A.4)
where the fractional part of the real number a is denoted by {a}.
Using (A.3) – (A.4) instead of (A.1) – (A.4) in the above argument, we obtain
44
U
￿
X
N
1[0,N ]
￿
= U
￿
1
r
r￿
i=1
X
k
1[N{(i−1)k/N}, N{ik/N}]
￿
> U
￿
X
k
1[0,k]
￿
.
Thus, (1) holds when N/k is rational.
(iii) Finally, since U is continuous while the rational numbers are dense in R+, (1) holds for
any real number N/k > 1. Q.E.D.
Appendix 3. Proof of Proposition 2.
It is readily verified that the inverse demands generated by preferences (7) are given by
D(xi,x) = u￿(xi). The uniqueness of the marginal utility implies that preferences are additive.
This proves part (i).
Assume now that U is homothetic. Since a utility is defined up to a monotonic transformation,
we may assume without loss of generality that U is homogenous of degree 1. This, in turn, signifies
that D(xi,x) is homogenous of degree 0 with respect to (xi, x). Indeed, because tU(x/t) = U(x)
holds for all t > 0, (2) can be rewritten as follows:
U(x+ h) = U(x) +
ˆ N
0
D
￿xi
t
,
x
t
￿
hi di+ ◦ (||h||2) . (A.5)
The uniqueness of the marginal utility together with (A.5) implies
D
￿xi
t
,
x
t
￿
= D(xi,x) for all t > 0
which shows that D is homogenous of degree 0. As a result, there exists a functional Φ belonging
to L2([0,N ]) such that D(xi,x) = Φ (x/xi). Q.E.D.
Appendix 4. For simplicity, we assume here that profits are not redistributed to consumers,
so that y is exogenous. When firms are quantity-setters or price-setters, firm i’s profits are given,
respectively, by
π(xi) = Lxi
￿
D(xi,x)
λ
− c
￿
− F,
Π(pi) = (pi − c)D(pi,p, Y )− F.
We show that the following five conditions are equivalent:
(i) π is strictly quasi-concave in xi for any positive value of λc;
(ii) π is strictly concave in xi for any positive value of λc;
(iii) the marginal revenue xiD￿i +D is strictly decreasing in xi for all xi > 0;
(iv) Π is strictly quasi-concave in pi for all positive values of c;
(v) 1/D is (−1)-convex in pi.
We do this by proving the following claims: (i)⇒ (iii)⇒ (ii)⇒ (i) and (iii)⇔ (iv)⇔ (v).
(i)⇒ (iii). This is proven in subsection 3.1.
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(iii)⇒ (ii). Diﬀerentiating π(xi) yields
π￿i =
L
λ
(xiD
￿
i +D)− c,
so that π￿￿i < 0 by (iii).
(ii)⇒ (i). Straightforward.
(iii)⇔ (iv). The first-order condition for maximizing Π may be written as follows:
pi +
D
D￿i
= c. (A.6)
Π is strictly quasi-concave in pi for all c > 0 if and only if (A.6) has at most one solution for
each c. This, in turn, holds if and only if the left-hand side of (A.6) either strictly increases in pi,
or strictly decreases in pi, for pi > 0. Since
pi +
D
D￿i
= pi
￿
1− 1
ε
￿
and ε > 1, we have
pi +
D
D￿i
> 0 lim
pi→0
￿
pi +
D
D￿i
￿
= 0.
Therefore, the left-hand side of (A.6) must increase in the neighborhood of pi = 0. This implies
that the strict quasi-concavity of Π is equivalent to
d
dpi
￿
pi +
D
D￿i
￿
> 0. (A.7)
Plugging pi = D/λ into (A.7) and using D(pi) = D−1(λpi) = xi, it is readily verified that (A.7)
becomes
d
dxi
(xiD
￿
i +D) < 0,
i.e., the marginal revenue strictly decreases in xi.
(iv) ⇔ (v) Π is strictly quasi-concave in pi for all c > 0 if and only if each solution to the
first-order condition (A.6) satisfies the second-order condition
(pi − c)D￿￿i + 2D￿i < 0. (A.8)
Solving (A.6) for pi − c and plugging the resulting expression into (A.8), we get
−DD
￿￿
i
D￿i
+ 2D￿i < 0,
which is equivalent to (1/D)￿￿ > 0, i.e., 1/D is strictly convex. Q.E.D.
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Appendix 5. We use an infinite-dimensional version of the definition proposed by Nadiri
(1982). Setting Di = D(xi,x), the elasticity of substitution between varieties i and j is given by
σ¯ = − DiDj(xiDj + xjDi)
xixj
￿
D￿iD
2
j −
￿
∂Di
∂xj
+ ∂Dj∂xi
￿
DiDj +D￿jD
2
i
￿ .
Since x is defined up to a zero measure set, it must be that
∂Di(xi,x)
∂xj
=
∂Dj(xj,x)
∂xi
= 0
for all j ￿= i. Therefore, we obtain
σ¯ = − DiDj(xiDj + xjDi)
xixj
￿
D￿iD
2
j +D
￿
jD
2
i
￿ .
Setting xi = xj = x implies Di = Dj, and thus we come to σ¯ = 1/η¯(x,x). Q.E.D.
Appendix 6. Let
ε¯(pi,p, Y ) ≡ −∂D(pi,p, Y )
∂pi
pi
D(pi,p, Y )
be the elasticity of the Marshallian demand (6). At any symmetric outcome, we have
ε(p,N) ≡ ε¯(p, pI[0,N ]).
Using the budget constraint p = y/Nx and (21) yields
ε(Y/Nx,N) = η(x,N) =
1
σ(x,N)
. (A.9)
When preferences are indirectly additive, using Roy’s identity yields the demand function for
variety i is given by
xi =
v￿(pi/Y )´ N
0 (pk/Y )v
￿(pk/Y )dk
,
which implies that ε(Y/Nx,N) = 1− θ(Y/p) where θ is given by (25). Combining this with (A.9),
we get σ(x,N) = 1/θ(Nx). Q.E.D.
Appendix 7. At a symmetric outcome the aggregate demand elasticity is given by
ε(p,N) =
ˆ
R+×Θ
ε(p,N ; y, θ)s(p,N ; y, θ)dG(y, θ), (A.10)
where s(p,N ; y, θ) is the share of the (y, θ)-type consumer’s individual demand in the aggregate
demand.
Diﬀerentiating (A.10) with respect to p yields
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∂ε(p,N)
∂p
=
ˆ
R+×Θ
￿
∂ε(p,N ; y, θ)
∂p
s+ ε(p,N ; y, θ)
∂s
∂p
￿
dG(y, θ). (A.11)
Using (65), we obtain
Ep(s) = ε(p,N)− ε(p,N ; y, θ).
Hence,
∂s
∂p
=
s
p
[ε(p,N)− ε(p,N ; y, θ)] .
Note that
ˆ
R+×Θ
s(p,N ; y, θ)dG(y, θ) = 1 ⇒
ˆ
R+×Θ
∂s
∂p
dG(y, θ) = 0. (A.12)
Therefore, plugging (A.12) into (A.11) and subtracting (ε(p,N)/p)
´
R+×Θ(∂s/∂p)dG(y, θ) = 0
from both sides of (A.12), we obtain the desired expression (64). Q.E.D.
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